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In this article the authors survey developments in the law of
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I. INTENTIONAL TORTS
A. Assault and Battery
In Kaczer v. Marrero' the plaintiff brought a negligence action
for injuries sustained when the defendant stabbed him in the back.
The parties stipulated that the defendant was insane at the time of
the act, and the plaintiff subsequently amended his complaint to
allege the tort of assault and battery. The trial court directed a
verdict for the plaintiff as to liability, and the jury returned a ver-
dict of $20,000 in damages.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed and held
that an insane person is responsible in a civil action for the tort of
assault and battery. The court based its holding on a prior case,
Jolley v. Powell,' which held that an affirmative defense of insanity
is not available to a defendant in a wrongful death action. Respond-
ing to the defendant's contention that the Jolley decision was not
controlling since it was expressly limited to unintentional torts, the
court held that the common law rule, making an insane person
liable in damages for his tortious acts, has not been abrogated in
Florida.
City of St. Petersburg v. Reed3 involved an assault and battery
action brought against the City of St. Petersburg and a police officer
by a youth who had attempted to escape arrest. When the defendant
police officer had attempted to apprehend the plaintiff for the felon-
ious crime of breaking and entering an automobile, the youth began
to run away, and the police officer shot him in the leg. At trial, the
plaintiff won a jury verdict of $50,000.
On appeal, the defendants contended that the trial court had
committed reversible error in admitting into evidence a city depart-
mental firearm order, which authorized using firearms to apprehend
a fleeing felon only when the officer reasonably believed that the
felon had committed a violent crime against another person, or a
crime against property that clearly demonstrated a wanton and
reckless disregard for human life. Agreeing with this contention, the
District Court of Appeal, Second District, held that the state-wide
standards4 for use of deadly force in making an arrest were control-
1. 324 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
2. 299 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
3. 330 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
4. FLA. STAT. § 776.05 (1975).
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ling. Under the state standards, when an officer has reasonable
grounds to believe one has committed a felony, the officer is entitled
to use force which is reasonably necessary to capture him, even to
the extent of killing or wounding him; the type of felony committed
does not matter. Therefore, the appellate court reversed and re-
manded the case for a new trial.
B. False Imprisonment and False Arrest
The separate tort actions of false imprisonment5 and malicious
prosecution protect closely related interests, and sometimes they
are confused by the courts.' In Carter v. City of St. Petersburg7 it
was the court's acknowledgement of the similar interests protected,
rather than its confusion, which led it to observe: "It is academic
that the essential elements of the two actions are distinct."8 The
District Court of Appeal, Second District, made this statement in
considering whether to extend the holding of Goldstein v. Sabella,
to a false arrest case.
Goldstein was a malicious prosecution case in which the Su-
preme Court of Florida held that a judgment of conviction, even
though subsequently reversed, is conclusive evidence of probable
cause unless it was obtained by fraud, prejudice, or other corrupt
means. Carter, however, involved a false arrest action brought by
union members against the city and two police officers as a result
of the arrest of the union members while they participated in a labor
dispute. After a summary judgment had been granted for the defen-
dants by the trial court, the Second District noted that the only
issue to be decided was whether the plaintiffs' convictions in munic-
ipal court, though subsequently reversed by the circuit court, con-
clusively established the existence of probable cause to support
their arrests and thus precluded the false arrest action. While the
Second District observed that apparently no Florida decisions had
applied malicious prosecution holdings directly to false arrest cases,
it found the rationale of Goldstein to be persuasive and adopted that
5. Except for terminology, false arrest is usually indistinguishable from false imprison-
ment as a cause of action. Johnson v. Weiner, 155 Fla. 169, 19 So. 2d 699 (1944).
6. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS. § 11, at 49 (4th ed. 1971). See Tobey v.
Orr, 92 Fla. 964, 970 111 So. 110, 112 (1926) (dissenting opinion).
7. 319 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
8. Id. at 604.
9. 88 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1956).
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case's holding in affirming the trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment.
In Manis v. Miller'" the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, decided an issue of first impression for the Florida courts:
whether a witness may be held liable for false imprisonment where
he has made an honest, good faith mistake in identifying a criminal
suspect which contributes to the arrest and prosecution of the sus-
pect. In holding that no liability could be imposed, the court rea-
soned that efficient law enforcement is dependent on the coopera-
tion of the private citizen with law enforcement officials: "Private
citizens should be encouraged to become interested and involved in
bringing the perpetrators of crime to justice and not discouraged
under apprehension or fear of recrimination.""
C. Malicious Prosecution
Under the rule of Gallucci v. Milavic,2 a committal order of a
justice of the peace raises a presumption of probable cause and
forecloses an action for malicious prosecution against the complain-
ant. This presumption may be rebutted, however, by proof that the
complainant resorted to fraud or other improper means in securing
the order. In the absence of such proof, the committal order resolves
the issue of probable cause.
The Supreme Court of Florida was urged to reconsider the
Gallucci rule in Rodgers v. W.T. Grant Co."3 Since the District
Court of Appeal, First District, viewed its decision as giving conclu-
sive effect to a committal order which was ostensibly an instrumen-
tality of injustice, it certified the following question as one of great
public interest: "Does the committal order of a magistrate import
probable cause to prosecute and thus bar a subsequent malicious
prosecution action, notwithstanding that the motive for its entry
was to bar that action?"'"
Rodgers was an action by a customer against a retail store to
recover for the alleged malicious prosecution of the customer on a
worthless check charge. Upon being informed of the facts at the
preliminary hearing on the worthless check charge, the justice of the
10. 327 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
11. Id.
12. 100 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1958).
13. 341 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 1976), rev'g 326 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
14. 326 So. 2d 57, 66 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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peace, apparently without instigation by the retailer, announced
that the charge would be dismissed if the customer would give the
retailer a release from liability. When the customer's attorney de-
clined, the justice of the peace responded: "The court doesn't want
to put either side in jeopardy, for that matter, so we will bind this
over to criminal court on a proper bond."' 5 Subsequently, the
State's attorney dismissed the charges without further proceedings.
At the trial for the malicious prosecution action, the circuit
court found the Gallucci rule to be controlling and entered a sum-
mary final judgment in favor of the retailer. The District Court of
Appeal, First District, affirmed; but on rehearing, the court noted
that ordering the customer bound over to criminal court for her
refusal to release what she considered to be a meritorious claim for
malicious prosecution was "the kind of conduct that generates well-
deserved contempt for the judicial process."'" Reasoning that it was
nevertheless bound by the Gallucci rule, the First District reluc-
tantly affirmed the order of summary final judgment and certified
the above question to the Supreme Court of Florida. Upon reviewing
the preliminary hearing transcript, the supreme court concluded
that the case was not governed by Gallucci. Since the court found
the transcript indicated that the magistrate did not order the com-
mittal because he found probable cause, it reversed the summary
judgment for the retailer, holding that the committal order did not
bar the malicious prosecution action.
The effect of the Rodgers holding is to limit the Gallucci rule.
A plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action now may overcome the
presumption of probable cause arising from a committal order by
showing that the committal itself was not based in fact on a finding
of probable cause. This attack on the presumption of probable cause
is in addition to that of offering proof that the complainant secured
the committal order by fraud or other improper means.
D. Defamation: Libel and Slander
1. SLANDER
In Matthews v. Deland State Bank 7 the plaintiff debtor sued
a bank for slander of credit. Two years after he had financed a new
15. 341 So. 2d at 513.
16. 326 So. 2d at 65.
17. 334 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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car with the bank, the debtor began to experience financial difficul-
ties and was unable to make payments on the car. In addition, the
car was in a collision, and the debtor did not have insurance to cover
the repairs. Soon after the collision, the debtor contracted with the
bank to satisfy the debt by returning the car.
Approximately three years later, the plaintiff wanted to pur-
chase a home and made an application for financing. When it was
denied, he contacted the local credit bureau to determine what was
on his record and found that it reflected a debt to the bank of about
$1,700 on the repossession. The plaintiff then contacted the bank
and was informed for the first time that it had lost over $500 on the
repossession of the car. He requested the bank to inform the credit
bureau that he owed approximately $500 instead of $1,700, but the
bank refused to cooperate. Subsequently, the plaintiff made another
application for financing and was again refused. Before sending out
credit reports on the plaintiff to the mortgage company, the credit
bureau in both instances had checked with the bank to determine
whether the indicated balance was still owed; on both occasions, the
bank had stated that it was. Approximately one year later, the bank
informed the credit bureau that the balance due from the plaintiff
on the automobile in question should have been reduced to $585.
In reversing the trial court's entry of a jury verdict against the
plaintiff, the District Court of Appeal, First District, held that
"disregard for the truth in reporting credit transactions, especially
when coupled with the failure to correct the inaccuracies, consti-
tutes libel per se."' 18 Noting that malice is presumed as a matter of
law where words are libelous per se, the appellate court concluded
that the trial court erred in iristructing the jury that the plaintiff
had to prove actual malice on the part of the bank before compensa-
tory or punitive damages could be awarded. The First District also
adopted the rule enunciated by the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, in Saunders Hardware Five and Ten, Inc. v. Low, "9 that
punitive damages may be awarded even though the amount of ac-
tual damages is not established, where the alleged defamation is
actionable per se. Thus, the court held that the trial court also erred
in instructing the jury that punitive damages could not be awarded
unless an award of compensatory damages was made.
18. Id. at 166. This holding by the court appears to be an extension of its prior decision
in Vinson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 259 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
19. 307 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
[Vol. 31:1283
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2. LEGISLATION
In 1976 the Florida Legislature amended 0 chapter 770 of Flor-
ida Statutes (1975). Section 770.01 of Florida Statutes (1975)1 was
amended to make the notice requirements which are a condition
precedent to bringing an action for libel or slander applicable to
broadcasts. Concomitantly, section 770.02 was amended in order to
make the statutory provisions pertaining to corrections, apologies,
or retractions by newspapers also applicable to broadcast stations.2
E. Fraud and Deceit
In an action for fraud and deceit, a plaintiff must allege three
elements: (1)that the defendant made a representation on which the
plaintiff was meant to act; (2) that the representation was false and
the defendant knew it was false; and (3) that the plaintiff relied on
the representation to his injury. 3 All three elements must appear
with reasonable certainty in the plaintiff's complaint.24
Seeking both compensatory and punitive damages, a vendee in
American International Land Corp. v. Hanna" brought an action
against a vendor for the alleged breach of an installment land sale
contract. Having paid for two alledgedly waterfront lots, the vendee
was contractually entitled to a deed. The vendor offered instead to
exchange two other lots in the same subdivision for the vendee's
lots. Unknown to the vendee, the vendor had begun construction of
a golf course on the vendee's lots. The vendee refused the exchange
offer and ultimately filed suit when the vendor persisted in his re-
fusal to issue a deed.
The trial court limited the vendee's recovery to compensatory
damages. Holding that the vendee's complaint alleged the indepen-
dent tort of an intentional, willful, and irrevocable conversion of
property, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed
and allowed punitive damages." However, the Supreme Court of
20. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 205 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 770.01-.02 (1975)).
21. FLA. STAT. § 770.01 (Supp. 1976).
22. FLA. STAT. § 770.02 (Supp. 1976).
23. American Int'l Land Corp. v. Hanna, 323 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1975); Mizell v. Up-
church, 46 Fla. 443, 35 So. 9 (1903).
24. American Int'l Land Corp. v. Hanna, 323 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1975), rev'g 289 So. 2d
756 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
25. Id. For a discussion of other aspects of this case see Boyer, Jamerson, & Surlas, Real
Property, 1976 Developments in Florida Law, 31 U. Mtiss L. REv. - (1977).
26. Hanna v. American Int'l Land Corp., 289 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974). In reach-
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Florida reinstated the trial court's order limiting recovery to com-
pensatory damages. Pointing out that real property cannot be the
subject of conversion, the court treated the Second District's finding
of conversion as an assertion that the complaint alleged the tort of
fraud and deceit. The court then held that the vendor's exchange
offer did not constitute an affirmative, false representation and that
the vendee did not rely upon a false representation to his detriment
since he refused the offer. Chief Justice Atkins argued in a
dissenting opinion that the complaint sufficiently alleged an inde-
pendent tort, based on the vendor's purported misrepresentation
that the vendee's property consisted of waterfront lots.2"
F. Trespass-Invasion of Privacy
In Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher2' the Supreme Court of
Florida decided a significant issue of first impression: whether there
is an implied consent by custom and usage to news media personnel
to enter a homeowner's premises subsequent to an emergency situa-
tion of public interest. While the plaintiff was absent from the state,
her home was severely damaged by fire. After the fire had been
extinguished, the fire marshal and a police sergeant entered the
residence to make their official investigation. They invited the news
media to accompany them, which they testified on deposition was
their standard practice.2" The body of the plaintiff's daughter was
discovered on a bedroom floor, and when it was removed, a silhou-
ette remained on the floor. Having exhausted their supply of film,
the officials requested the photographer of the defendant newspaper
publisher to take a picture of the silhouette since it demonstrated
that the body was on the floor prior to the fire. The picture taken
by the photographer was delivered to the authorities to be made a
part of their official file, but it also was delivered to the defendant
newspaper which published it along with an account of the fire. The
plaintiff first learned of the facts surrounding the death of her
ing this result, the Second District relied on the rationale of Griffith v. Shamrock Village,
Inc., 94 So. 2d 854, 858 (Fla. 1957): "[Wlhere the acts constituting a breach of contract also
amount to a cause of action in tort there may be a recovery of exemplary damages upon proper
allegations and proof." 289 So. 2d at 758.
27. 323 So. 2d at 570.
28. 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976), rev'g 319 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
29. Various news media organizations filed affidavits which stated that it is common
custom and usage to permit news media to enter under such circumstances. Id. at 916.
[Vol. 31:1283
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daughter by reading the newspaper story and viewing the published
photographs.
Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the newspaper publisher on
three counts: Count I alleged trespass and invasion of privacy;
Count II alleged invasion of privacy without reference to trespass;
and Count III alleged wrongful intentional infliction of emotional
distress and sought punitive damages. The trial court dismissed
Count II with prejudice and granted a summary final judgment in
favor of the publisher on Counts I and III.
On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, First District, re-
versed 0 as to the granting of summary judgment on Count I. The
appellate court noted that while cases have construed custom and
usage to imply consent to enter onto business property and into
business establishments, as well as onto private residential property
of another, no case had held that consent by custom and usage
authorizes entry into the private dwelling of another. Observing that
the plaintiff neither impliedly nor expressly invited the defendant's
employees into her home, the court held that no basis existed for
establishing an implied consent by custom and usage. The court
further stated that although the plaintiff had conceded that the fire
marshall and police rightfully entered the premises in performing
their official duties, there was nothing to indicate that those officials
had, in the absence of an emergency, authority to invite others to
do so. Finally, the court held that although the report published by
the defendant was of legitimate public interest and was not, per se,
an invasion of the plaintiff's privacy, if the entry by the defendant's
employee constituted a trespass, it also constitited a sufficient basis
for the tort of invasion of privacy.
The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed and held that the First
District erred in reversing the summary judgment for the defen-
dants as to Count I. The supreme court determined that the trial
court had properly decided on the basis of the record before it that
"it was common usage, custom and practice for news media to enter
private premises and homes under the circumstances present
here," and thus the entry by the defendant's photographer was
lawful and nonactionable.
30. 319 So. 2d'100 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
31. 340 So. 2d at 918.
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G. Tortious Interference with Economic Relationships
1. CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
Babson Bros. Co. v. Allison32 involved a suit against a farm
equipment manufacturer by one of its dealers, alleging malicious
interference with a contract between the dealer and the manufac-
turer's local distributing affiliate. The manufacturer was a closely
held family corporation which had formed distribution companies,
including the affiliate in question, in various parts of the country
as warehouse operations to distribute its farm equipment. All the
stock in both the manufacturing and distribution corporations was
held by the Babson family; all the officers and directors of the
distribution company were officers and directors of the manufac-
turer. In serving as a state regional dealer for the defendant manu-
facturer's equipment, the plaintiff operated under a contract with
the local distributing affiliate which by its terms expired after one
year, and was terminable at will on notice by either party. Because
of alleged dissatisfaction with the plaintiff as a dealer, an employee
of the manufacturer sent notice to the plaintiff that his dealership
would not be renewed. This employee had been delegated the au-
thority to determine whether dealership agreements would be re-
newed or canceled. The fact that the employee was associated with
the manufacturer, rather than with its local distributing affiliate,
formed the basis for the dealer's interference suit.
At trial, the circuit court entered judgment upon a jury verdict
against the manufacturer. The District Court of Appeal, First Dis-
trict, reversed, holding on the basis of two independent reasons that
the manufacturer could not be liable for contractual interference:
(1) the employee had acted within the scope of his authority; and
(2) the manufacturer was privileged to interfere with the contract.
The manufacturer's privilege was based on its financial interest in
the business of its distributing affiliate. 3  This financial interest was
deemed manifested by the common stock ownership of the two cor-
porations as well as by the manufacturer's obvious interest in its
distributors' contracts with dealers who sold and serviced its prod-
ucts.
32. 337 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 769 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969), which the
court cited in its discussion of privilege based on financial interest.
[Vol. 31:1283
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2. BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS
In Smith v. Ocean State Bank 4 the District Court of Appeal,
First District, noted: "[T]ortious interference with a contract and
tortious interference with a business relationship are basically the
same cause of action. The only material difference appears to be
that in one there is a contract and in the other there is only a
business relationship."3 5
The Smith case represents the most recent attempt by a Florida
appellate court to delineate the elements of tortious interference
with a business relationship. Prior to Smith the District Court of
Appeal, Third District, had held that these elements included: (1)
the existence of a business relationship not necessarily evidenced by
an enforceable contract; (2) the defendant's fraudulent inducement
of the plaintiff's business associate causing the latter to act in a way
which destroys the plaintiff's business relationship; and (3) damage
to the plaintiff as a result of the breach of the relationship." Subse-
quent to this formulation by the Third District, the District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, concluded that fraud was not a necessary
element of the tort37 and substituted in place of the element of
fraudulent inducement the intentional and unjustified interference
with the plaintiff's business relationship by the defendant."
In Smith the trial court had dismissed a counterclaim alleging
tortious interference with a business relationship. On appeal, the
First District listed the following four elements as necessary to es-
tablish this tort: "(1)[T]he existence of a business relationship not
necessarily evidenced by an enforceable contract; (2) knowledge of
the relationship on the part of the interferer; (3) an intentional and
unjustified interference with that relationship; and (4) damage as a
result of the breach of the relationship."3 The appellate court then
held that the complaint stated all of these elements and reversed
the trial court.
34. 335 So. 2d 641 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1976).
35. Id. at 642.
36. John B. Reid & Assocs. v. Jimenez, 181 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
37. J. Rolfe Davis, Inc. v. Symon, 232 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
38. Symon v. J. Rolfe Davis, Inc., 245 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
39. 335 So. 2d at 644.
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II. NEGLIGENCE
A. Negligent Acts: Duty
A necessary element of a negligence cause of action is a showing
by the plaintiff that the defendant owed him a duty and that this
duty was breached. In a case of first impression in Florida, the
District Court of Appeal, Second District, recently had to decide
whether one can owe a duty to an unborn fetus. The plaintiff in Day
v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.40 had been born with severe
cerebral damage allegedly caused during an automobile accident
which had occurred while he was still in his mother's womb in his
sixth week of gestation. After noting that the overwhelming trend
in the United States is to permit recovery for prenatal injuries, the
court considered whether a distinction should be made on the basis
of the child's viability at the time of injury. The defendant at-
tempted to analogize to cases holding that there is a right to
abortion during the first trimester of a woman's pregnancy.' The
Second District found, however, that any "child injured before birth
and born alive is a person under the Florida and Federal Constitu-
tions,"' 2 and is therefore entitled to the same rights and protections
afforded to all persons. The court's position is the same as that of
the Restatement of Torts.43
Another case of first impression answered the question of
whether a minor dependent child has a derivative claim arising from
injuries to his parent if the parent does not die as a result of the
alleged negligence. Following the weight of authority set in other
jurisdictions, the Second District held in Clark v. Suncoast Hospi-
tal, Inc." that a child does not have such a derivative claim and
cannot recover damages for his intangible losses.
When a landowner hires an independent contractor to perform
certain functions, the landowner is usually not liable for injuries
40. 328 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976). A collateral issue involves the situation where a
child is stillborn as a result of such injuries. In Miller v. Highlands Insurance Co., 336 So. 2d
636 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976), the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, found that parents of
an unborn viable fetus have a wrongful death action against one who negligently brought
about the death of the fetus. The Miller case is discussed in part II, section D, infra.
41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
42. 328 So. 2d at 562.
43. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 869 (Tent. Draft No. 16, April 1970). Comment (d) to
section 869 specifically states that viability of the fetus should not be the determining factor.
44. 338 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
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sustained by the contractor's employees during their work.,' How-
ever, if the owner has actual or constructive knowledge of a danger-
ous condition, he may have a duty to warn those who work for an
independent contractor," although notice to the contractor or super-
visor is generally a sufficient performance of this duty. 7 In Lake
Parker Mall, Inc. v. Carson48 an employee of an independent electri-
cal contractor was killed in an explosion at an electrical switchboard
in the defendant's shopping mall. The plaintiff contended that the
mall should be held to the higher standard of care" of an electrical
utility since the electrical facilities of the mall were extensive. Re-
jecting this contention, the District Court of Appeal, Second Dis-
trict, held the mall to a standard of ordinary care and refused to
hold the mall liable for the independent contractor's failure to make
its employees aware of a known danger.
A landowner's duty may be higher to an invitee than to a new
licensee. In Hall v. Holton'" a policeman, who was injured when he
fell through a floor during an investigation of an abandoned build-
ing, contended that he occupied a higher status than a licensee and
therefore a greater duty of care was owed to him by the building
owner. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, rejected this
argument but still reversed the trial court's summary judgment for
the landowner. The duty owed to a licensee is to refrain from wanton
negligence, willful misconduct, or intentionally exposing him to
danger, and to warn him of a defect or condition which the land-
owner knows to be dangerous and not readily obvious to the licen-
see. The court examined the rule used by some courts that before a
duty to warn of hidden dangers arises, the owner must be aware of
the licensee's presence. Finding this rule to be too narrow, the
Second District construed it to "include those circumstances where
the owner could reasonably anticipate that the licensee would be on
his premises."'" Since the owner in Holton had been aware that
vagrants occupied his building on occasions and that the police
periodically investigated the premises, he did not satisfy his burden
of showing he had no reason to expect the presence of the officer.
45. See Florida Publishing Co. v. Lourcey, 141 Fla. 767, 193 So. 847 (1940).
46. See Somers v. Meyers, 171 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
47. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Robinson, 68 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1953).
48. 327 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
49. See Orr v. United States, 486 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1973).
50. 330 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
51. Id. at 83.
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The scope of the duty owed to a student by a county board of
public instruction and a school's supervising principal was the sub-
ject of litigation in Oglesby v. Seminole County Board of Public
Instruction.5 2 A student with known propensities for violence was
suspended from public school for creating a disturbance and shortly
thereafter assaulted and beat another youth, who died as a result
of the injuries. The incident took place off the school's campus and
was not connected with any school program or facility. Suit was
filed against the school board and the supervising principal, alleging
a breach of their duty to properly supervise the students. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, noted the possibility of sover-
eign immunity but squarely rested its decision to affirm the dis-
missal of the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that no such duty
was owed;
We simply hold that where a public school student has been
suspended from a school and has been removed from the school
grounds and all school related facilities and programs, neither the
school board nor the supervising principal of the school have any
further duty to supervise or oversee the conduct of such sus-
pended student at locations which are off campus and which are
non-school related.5 3
Since no duty existed, the court stated it was not necessary to
determine whether there was a casual connection.
The duty of a truck repairman as a bailee was examined in
Fruehauf Corp. v. Aetna Insurance Co.5 Suit was brought against
the repairman to recover damages for a truck which had been stolen.
The bailee had contracted with a guard service to protect his prem-
ises. The general rule is that a bailee is not an insurer of property
entrusted to him and is liable only if he fails to exercise that degree
of care which a reasonably prudent person would use in protecting
his own property.55 In addition to hiring the guards, the bailee's
security precautions included maintaining a chain link fence with
barbed wire at the top, lighting the property with numerous mer-
cury vapor lamps, and placing all vehicle keys in a safe place. The
District Court of Appeal, First District, noted that it would not
usually be necessary for a bailee to employ a guard service to fulfill
52. 328 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
53. Id. at 516-17.
54. 336 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
55. See Hollander v. Nolan Brown Motors, Inc., 272 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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his duty of care. As a matter of policy, the court stated it would be
unreasonable to impose a higher standard of care simply because a
bailee had undertaken something he was not obligated to do. How-
ever, the court recognized that a bailee could be negligent in the
manner in which the guard service was hired or maintained. There
was no such evidence introduced. Likewise, there was no substantial
evidence that the guard service was an employee, as distinct from
an independent contractor, such that vicarious liability would ob-
tain. Nevertheless, negligence of the bailee might have been found
irrespective of any alleged negligence of the guard service. A large
hole in the fence, a lighting system which could have been consid-
ered inadequate, and a missing truck key provided ample evidence
of negligence on the part of the bailee. The court found such negli-
gence to be at least a "concurrent proximate cause,"5 and affirmed
the verdict for the plaintiff.Under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine an owner of an
automobile may be held liable for its negligent operation by one
driving the car with permission. 7 Yet, the owner might not be held
liable to third parties when an employee drives a car while acting
within the control or direction of his employer." In Demshar v. AAA
Con Auto Transport, Inc.," however, liability did attach to the
owner of an automobile when it was being operated by a driver hired
to transport the car from Florida to Ohio. The owner of the car
argued that the driver of the car was an agent of the transport
company, and therefore, that company should be primarily liable
for injuries resulting from the accident. However, the bill of lading
signed by the owner expressly stated that the driver was not to be
an agent of the transport comapny, but rather an independent con-
tractor. The Supreme Court of Florida, in adopting the Fourth Dis-
trict's opinion in its entirety, gave this evidence strong weight and
found the owner to be liable under the dangerous instrumentality
doctrine.
The issue of whether one owes a duty is sometimes preempted
by statutes which confer immunity. The Florida Mental Health
Act,60 also known as the Baker Act, was a compendium of rights for
56. 336 So. 2d at 461.
57. See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920).
58. See Patrick v. Faircloth Buick Co., 185 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966); Pettite v.
Welch, 167 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
59. 337 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1976).
60, FLA. STAT. §§ 394.451-.478 (1975).
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persons confined for treatment of mental illness. As originally en-
acted, the law provided that, absent bad faith, a doctor or hospital
would be immune from civil or criminal liability for actions in
connection with admission, treatment, diagnosis, or discharge of a
patient to or from such a facility.' In Burroughs v. Board of
Trustees2 a patient who suffered from alcoholism and deep
depression was given a day pass and subsequently was involved in
an automobile accident in which other individuals were injured.
Suit was filed against the hospital and doctor on the theory that
they were negligent since they knew or should have known the pa-
tient would be likely to operate an automobile either under the
influence of alcohol or medication. The trial court entered summary
judgment against the plaintiffs on the ground that the defendants
were immune under the Baker Act. The District Court of Appeal,
First District, reversed, finding the Baker Act inapplicable to the
situation:
[Als it affects persons other than the patient, his family and
any others who may claim by and through the patient . . . the
Act has no application to the claims of strangers to the relation-
ship of patient, hospital and doctor who may suffer injury as a
result of negligent conduct arising out of that relationship. 3
Hence, the court found that a cause of action existed without resort-
ing to the 1973 amendment which specifically excludes immunity
when negligence is involved. 4
The nature of an attorney's duty to his client was examined in
Dillard v. Smith Construction Co. 5 A contractor who had sub-
contracted a pile driving job, which was further subcontracted to
the one who eventually performed it, brought a legal malpractice
action against his attorney. When a claim for extra pile driving
came back up the chain of subcontractors, the contractor worried
whether he could apply for "final payment" of the contract price
without losing his claim against the owner for the extra cost. The
61. FLA. STAT. § 394.459(12) (1971), as amended by 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-133, § 3
codified at FLA. STAT. § 394.459(13) (1975)). The amendment provided that the section would
not relieve a person from liability for negligence, but such amendment was subsequent to the
time of the incident in this case.
62. 328 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
63. 328 So. 2d at 541.
64. See note 61 supra.
65. 337 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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contract between the owner and contractor specifically provided
that "final payment" would constitute a waiver of all claims not
previously made. A lawyer's advice was sought, and he suggested
obtaining final payment, which resulted in the bar of future claims
against the owner. The contractor brought a legal malpractice ac-
tion against his lawyer asserting that he gave his advice negligently
when he suggested accepting -final payment, and that he negligently
failed to read the contract and release before exercising his judg-
ment that it would be proper. The District Court of Appeal, First
District found the first assertion to be without merit since "a lawyer
does not guarantee the efficacy of his advice . . . , [and] contrac-
tual interpretations . . . do not become actionable simply because
a court later rules against his client."6 The lawyer was found to
have espoused a reasonable, although ultimately wrong, position.
The allegation that the lawyer was negligent in failing to read the
contract and release prior to exercising his professional judgment
was found to have merit, however, and it therefore stated a valid
cause of action.
The extent of a manufacturer's duty to build a crashworthy
automobile has been the subject of much debate over the last ten
years. The issue is whether an automobile can be so defective in
design as to make the manufacturer liable to a passenger where the
passenger's injuries resulted from his impact against the interior of
the automobile (the "second impact") subsequent to a collision (the
"first impact"). The two leading cases in the nation are Evans v.
General Motors Corp.7 and Larsen v. General Motors Corp."6 The
Evans court answered the question in the negative, finding that the
intended purpose of an automobile did not include participation in
a collision. The Larsen court, in coming to the opposite conclusion,
suggested that the intended use of an automobile encompassed pro-
viding a safe means of transportation, even in a crash.
The Supreme Court of Florida in Ford Motor Co. v. Evancholl
adopted the Larsen rationale and held that a "manufacturer must
use reasonable care in design and manufacure of its product to
eliminate unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury."70 Since automo-
66. Id. at 843,
67. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
68. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
69. 327 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976).
70. Id. at 204.
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bile crashes are foreseeable as a "frequent and inevitable contin-
gency of normal automobile use,"'" the approach is consistent with
general negligence principles. The subsequent adoption of strict lia-
bility" probably will not have a substantial impact on this doctrine.
B. Proximate Cause
In a negligence action the plaintiff must prove that his injuries
were proximately caused by the defendant's negligent acts. A negli-
gent defendant may successfully defend, however, by showing that
an independent and unforeseeable intervening event was the proxi-
mate cause of the injury. Furthermore, if there is such an interven-
ing cause, the issue of proximate causation may be a question for
the court to resolve.74
In Nance v. James Archer Smith Hospital3 the District Court
of Appeal, Third District, encountered the issue of intervening caus-
ation. An emergency patient was taken to the hospital because he
had been behaving strangely and apparently had taken a pill con-
taining LSD. The hospital ward clerk advised the patient's friends
and relatives who had brought him to the emergency room that the
hospital lacked the necessary testing facilities to provide proper
treatment and suggested that he be taken to a larger hospital. While
being driven to another hospital, the patient jumped out of the car,
ran crazily through an apartment building, and mortally stabbed a
man. The wife of the victim brought a wrongful death action against
the hospital contending that it was negligent in turning away an
emergency patient who was a clear danger to himself and others.
The Third District affirmed a judgment for the hospital, holding as
a matter of law that the acts of the patient were an independent
intervening cause and were not reasonably foreseeable.
In National Airlines, Inc. v. Edwards71 a passenger sued an
airline to recover for illness and injuries allegedly incurred when she
was forced to eat and drink Cuban food after her plane was hijacked
to Cuba. The plaintiff alleged that the airline was negligent in per-
mitting the armed hijackers to board the plane. The Supreme Court
71. Id..
72. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
73. Rawls v. Ziegler, 107 So. 2d 601, 604-05 (Fla. 1958).
74. Kwoka v. Campbell, 296 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
75. 329 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
76. 336 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1976).
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of Florida held that the injuries allegedly suffered as a result of
consumption of Cuban food were too remote to be recoverable be-
cause the food and drink were active and efficient intervening
causes of the injuries.
Two recent Third District cases decided whether the owner of
an automobile is responsible for injuries caused by the negligence
of a thief who stole the automobile. In Vining v. Avis Rent-a-Car
Systems, Inc." a rental car was stolen from the airport parking lot
where the vehicle was allegedly unattended with the keys in the
ignition, a door open, and the lights on. The thief subsequently
caused an accident in which the plaintiff was injured. The com-
plaint alleged that the car was left in a condition which attracted
attention and that this constituted negligence which proximately
caused the plaintiff's injuries. Moreover, the plaintiff contended
that the defendant's violation of Florida's "Unattended Motor Vehi-
cle" statute7" constituted negligence. The appellate court noted that
a previous case, Lingefelt v. Hanner,79 had absolved a car owner of
liability when injuries were caused by a thief who had stolen a car
with an unlocked ignition switch. The court reiterated its holding
in Lingefelt that even though violation of a state statute is evidence
of negligence, the determinative issue is causation. The court pro-
ceeded to decide that the criminal act of the thief broke the chain
of causation from the original negligence of leaving the keys in the
ignition and that the injuries received were not reasonably foreseea-
ble. Since the legal and factual issues were of such importance,
however, the court certified this question to the Supreme Court of
Florida.
Schwartz v. American Home Assurance Co.80 involved similar
facts and issues. In that case a car was stolen which had been left
unattended in front of a bar with the key in the glove compartment
and a package in the back seat. The thief's subsequent negligence
resulted in the death of one pedestrian and injury to another. Be-
cause the keys were not left in the ignition, the majority stated that
the "Unattended Motor Vehicle" statute was not violated, although
77. 330 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
78. FLA. STAT. § 316.097 (1975). The statutory language provides in pertinent part: "No
person driving or in charge of any motor vehicle . . . shall permit it to stand unattended
without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition, and removing the key."
79. 125 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
80. 334 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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the dissenting judge argued that the statute is violated by merely
failing to remove the key.' Furthermore, the court relied on its
previous decision in Vining and affirmed summary judgment for the
defendant owner.
An intervening criminal act was held to be foreseeable in
Nicholas v. Miami Burglar Alarm Co.82 The owner of a warehouse
had allegedly contracted with a burglar alarm company to notify the
police in the event that either an alarm or trouble signal was
tripped. Burglars cut two of the alarm's telephone wires which
tripped the trouble signal. The telephone comapny was notified, but
the police were never called. The warehouse owner brought suit
against the burglar alarm company for its negligent breach of con-
tract, seeking compensatory damages for stolen goods as well as
punitive damages.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida held that "a bur-
glar alarm company under contract to monitor an alarm system
may be negligent for failure to inform the police or the warehouse
owner of a trouble signal which its employees had received."83 The
court distinguished cases which precluded liability because of a
malfunction in the burglar alarm system since such a malfunction
may be unforeseeable. In Nicholas the intervening criminal act was
found to be reasonably foreseeable; thus, a cause of action existed.
The supreme court stated, however, that punitive damages could
not be recovered since the allegations did not establish an inten-
tional wrong amounting to a tort, nor did they constitute willful or
wanton negligence. Justice Adkins dissented on the issue of punitive
damages and suggested that this question should go to the jury.
If an injury is not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of a
defendant's negligent act, the act cannot be the proximate cause of
the injury. For example, in Jolly v. Insurance Co. of North Americal4
a woman came home for lunch to find her house on fire. The fire
was almost under control when the fire truck's water tank became
exhausted. Moreover, nearby water hydrants were inoperative be-
cause of improper maintenance by the Aqueduct Authority. Seeing
her house burn to the ground with firemen standing around helpless
to take action, the woman became aggravated and upset; she died
81. See note 78 supra.
82. 339 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1976).
83. Id. at 177.
84. 331 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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two days later. A wrongful death action was brought against the city
and water authority for failure to properly maintain the water sys-
tem. Finding that the alleged negligence was not the proximate
cause of the woman's injuries, the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the wrongful death
complaint. The court held that as a matter of law such a result was
not reasonably foreseeable. However, genuine issues of material fact
were found to exist concerning causation of the property damage
and the city's waiver of immunity by purchasing liability insurance.
C. Medical Malpractice
The Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975 s5 requires injured
parties to submit their malpractice claims to mediation panels for
determining the issue of liability before filing an action in any Flor-
ida court. 8 In Carter v. Sparkman7 the constitutionality of these
mediation panels was challenged on the basis of three theories: (1)
that section 768.133 of Florida Statutes (1975) constituted a denial
of due process and equal protection under both the state"8 and fed-
eral constitutions since it mandated that a plaintiff submit to me-
diation before filing suit but allowed a physicial the option of either
submitting his defenses to mediation or waiting until trial; (2) that
section 768.133 denied the plaintiff timely access to the courts;9° and
(3) that section 768.134(1) infringed on the constitutional right of
the Supreme Court of Florida to regulate practice and procedure in
the state courts." In rejecting each of the theories presented, the
Supreme Court of Florida construed the statutes pertaining to me-
diation panels so that they would operate in a manner consistent
with the constitution.
In arguing his first theory, the plaintiff pointed out that section
768.134(2) makes the result of mediation proceedings admissible
evidence in subsequent court actions where both the plaintiff and
physician participate in the mediation, but the statute does not
mention the admissibility of a refusal .to participate by the physi-
85. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-9.
86. FLA. STAT. § 768.133(1)(a) (1975).
87. 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976).
88. FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 9.
89. U.S. CONST. amendsV, XIV.
90. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
91. Id. art V, §§ 2, 13.
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cian. While agreeing with the plaintiff that this arrangement would
be unconstitutional if it made a physician's nonparticipation inad-
missible, the supreme court construed the statute to mean that
where a plaintiff has participated in a mediation proceeding, the
physician's failure to participate is admissible evidence in a subse-
quent civil medical malpractice trial.
In dealing with the plaintiff's third theory, the court examined
the language of section 768.134(1), the specific statute under attack.
This section provides, in part: "[Iln any civil medical malpractice
action, the trial on the merits shall be conducted without any refer-
ence to insurance, insurance coverage, or joinder of an insurer as a
co-defendant in the suit." The supreme court determined that the
legislature intended to bar only "any reference" to the joinder of
insurers rather than joinder itself. Noting that "references" to insur-
ance or insurers during the course of trial is a purely procedural
matter relating to the conduct of trial proceedings, the court held
that the legislature had acted beyond its power to the extent that
it had attempted to control such "references." Since the court
agreed with the policy behind this part of the statute, however, it
adopted the substance of it in promulgating a new rule of procedure
for all medical malpractice trials: "Rule 1. 450(e)-In any civil med-
ical malpractice action, the trial on the merits shall be conducted
without any reference to insurance, to insurance coverage, or to
joinder of an insurer as co-defendant in the suit.""2
In 1976 the Florida Legislature amended the malpractice act . 3
Among the more significant changes, section 627.353 was trans-
ferred to section 768.5411 and changed to state that all health care
providers (instead of specifically designated providers) obtaining
liability insurance in the amount of $100,000 or more per claim, or
otherwise providing equivalent security pursuant to the act, will not
be liable for an amount in excess of $100,000 per claim for claims
covered by the patient's compensation fund. Section 768.5011 was
created to provide, inter alia, for the reduction of damge awards
under certain circumstances by collateral sources of indemnity."
This section also limits subrogation rights of insurers" and states
92. 335 So. 2d at 806.
93. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-260.
94. FLA. STAT. § 768.54 (Supp. 1976).
95. FLA. STAT. § 768.50 (Supp. 1976).
96. FLA. STAT. § 768.50(1) (SuPP.1976).
97. FLA. STAT. § 768.50(4) (Supp. 1976).
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that for legal fees based on a percentage of money awarded, the
percentage is to be based on the net amount of the award as reduced
by the amounts of collateral sources and as increased by insurance
premiums paid."
Three additional new sections were created during this session
of the legislature. Section 768.4599 sets standards of care for health
care providers; section 768.48 °10 requires the use of an itemized
verdict. The trier of fact must first itemize the verdict into specified
categories. 10 Each category is to be further itemized to reflect
whether it represents past or future damages. 0° In section 768.51 the
legislation provides for alternative methods of paying damage
awards where the claimant's future losses exceed $200,000. The
court may, at the request of either party, enter a judgment ordering
the damages to be paid in whole or in part by periodic payments. 3
D. Wrongful Death Actions
The constitutionality of Florida's most recent Wrongful Death
Act ' 4 was challenged again'05 during the survey period. In White
v. Clayton' two sisters of a decedent sought, through the ad-
ministratrix, to recover loss of net accumulations beyond death.
The Act limits recovery of net accumulations beyond death to the
decedent's spouse or lineal descendents. 07 The trial judge denied
defendant's motion to strike the allegation of such damages from
the complaint, finding that the restriction to only lineal descen-
dants (or spouse) violated equal protection standards and was there-
fore unconstitutional.
98. FLA. STAT. § 768.50(3) (Supp. 1976).
99. FLA. STAT. § 768.45 (Supp. 1976).
100. FLA. STAT. § 768.48 (Supp. 1976).
101. FLA. STAT. § 768.48(1) (Supp. 1976).
102. FLA. STAT. § 768.48(2) (Supp. 1976).
103. FLA. STAT. § 768.51 (Supp. 1976).
104. FMA. STAT. §§ 768.16-.27 (1975).
105. The constituionality of the Act first was challenged in Martin v. United Sec. Servs.,
Inc., 314 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1975). Martin held that the right of surviving close relatives to
recover for their own pain and suffering resulting from the wrongful death of the decedent is
a constitutional alternative to the right of survivors to divide damages awarded under the
survivor statute for the decedent's own pain and suffering. The Martin court also decided that
punitive damages are recoverable under the new law when one or more elements of compensa-
tory damages recoverable under the Act are established. However, only one punitive damage
recovery is permitted for each death.
106. 323 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1975).
107. FLA. STAT. § 768.21(6)(a) (1975).
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On certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida quashed the trial
court's order and held that the Act did not violate the equal protec-
tion clauses of either the Florida or the Federal Constitutions. Not-
ing that the clear "purpose of the act is to provide recovery to those
who need it, specifically the surviving spouse, children, or depen-
dents of the decendent,"'' 8 the supreme court found that the classifi-
cation was not an unreasonable one and, therefore, was constitu-
tional. The court noted that it is a legislative prerogative to enact
changes in the elements of damages or the standards, by which they
are recoverable even though damages will be greater in some situa-
tions and less in others.' 9
The constitutionality of the Act was also attacked in Bassett v.
Merlin, Inc."' In that case the parents of a decedent over twenty-
one years of age had attempted to recover net accumulations; sec-
tion 768.21(4) prohibited their recovery for pain and suffering be-
cause the law only allowed such damages for loss of minor chil-
dren."' The parents had originally sought to be classified as lineal
descendants, but the District Court of Appeal, Third District, found
that parents were ascendants and not within the scope of the stat-
ute."2 Upon remand, the decedent's parents attacked the constitu-
tionality of the law on the grounds that it denied parents of an adult
child the right to damages for pain and suffering. Citing White as
controlling, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the trial judge's
decision that the provision was constitutional.
The Supreme court recently confirmed that Florida's Emanci-
pation Act,"' which lowered the age of majority from twenty-one to
eighteen, amended the definition of "minor children" in Florida's
Wrongful Death Act. That law originally defined minor children as
"unmarried children under 21 years of age.""' In Hanley v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co."5 parents of a decedent who was nineteen
years old sought to recover damages for mental pain and suffering
from his wrongful death. The supreme court found that the legisla-
tive intent of the Emancipation Act was explicit in amending all
108. 323 So. 2d at 575-76.
109. Id.
110. 335 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1976).
111. FA. STAT. § 768.21(4) (1975).
112. Basset v. Merlin, Inc., 304 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
113. FLA. STAT. § 743.07 (1975).
114. FLA. STAT. § 768.18(2) (1975).
115. 334 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1976).
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laws defining "minors" to conform to the lowered age of majority.
Therefore, the court held that the Emancipation Act amended the
definition of "minor" in Florida's Wrongful Death Act to mean any
unmarried child under the age of eighteen."'
In Davis v. Simpson"7 the parents of a stillborn child sought to
recover under the Wrongful Death Act, alleging that the negligence
of the doctors resulted in the fetus not being born alive. The District
Court of Appeal, First District, affirmed the trial court's dismissal,
holding that a full-term, viable, but stillborn fetus is not a "person"
within the meaning of the Wrongful Death Act. The District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, subsequently came to the opposite con-
clusion in deciding the same issue in Miller v. Highlands Insurance
Co.'8 A parent, as personal representative of a seven-month-old
viable fetus, brought a wrongful death action claiming that her child
would have survived but for the negligence of the defendant in an
automobile accident where the unborn child was killed. The evi-
dence indicated that the unborn child was capable of sustaining its
own life outside the mother's womb. The issue was whether the
unborn child was a "person" as contemplated by Florida Statutes
section 768.19 (1975). The Fourth District decided that it was and
held that recovery for wrongful death was proper. The court distin-
guished Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. ,"' where parents of
a stillborn fetus sought recovery under the former Wrongful Death
of a Minor Act.'20 The Stokes court had specifically mentioned the
possibility of a recovery under the former general Wrongful Death
Act'2 ' if the fetus could be established as a "person" under the
statute. Furthermore, the Fourth District in Miller specifically dis-
approved of the First District's decision in Davis.
In determining whether the parents had a cause of action under
the Act, the Miller court relied on both a liberal construction of the
statutory language and the opinion of the Second District in Day v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. " Under the new Act, a condition
to recovery is that "the event would have entitled the person injured
116. Id. at 13.
117. 313 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
118. 336 So. 2d636 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
119. 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968).
120. 1903 Fla. Laws ch. 63-469, §1 (repealed 1972).
121. 1953 Fla. Laws ch. 28280, §1 (repealed 1972).
122. 328 So. 2d 560 (Fla. -2d Dist. 1976). The Day case is discussed in more detail in part
II, section A, supra.
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to maintain an action and recover damages if death had not en-
sued." '23 In Day a child born alive was found to have a cause of
action against a tortfeasor who allegedly caused the child's prenatal
injuries. The Second District, noting that courts throughout the
nation are split on the issue, relied on the "public policy of the state
to shift the losses resulting when wrongful death occurs from the
survivors of the decedent to the wrongdoer"'24 and held that a cause
of action would lie for wrongful death.
The court also addressed the question of what damages may be
recovered and held that medical expenses (if incurred for the benefit
of the viable unborn child itself), funeral expenses, and mental pain
and suffering of the unborn child's parents all may be recovered.
The court decided, however, that damages for loss of support and
services of the stillborn child are not recoverable. The court stated
that such damages would be impossible to prove by competent evi-
dence and should "not be addressed on the basis of sheer specula-
tion."" 5
Florida Statutes Section 768.24 (1975) reads as follows:
A survivor's death before final judgment shall limit the survivor's
recovery to lost support and services to the date of his death. The
personal representative shall pay the amount recovered to. the
personal representative of the deceased survivor.
The proper construction of this provision was the subject of litiga-
tion in Florida Clarklift, Inc. v. Reutimann,'26 where a minor child
was killed in an automobile accident. Prior to final judgment in the
ensuing wrongful death action, the deceased's mother also died. The
trial court allowed the deceased child's personal representative to
recover for pain and suffering of the mother prior to her own death
but disallowed recovery of punitive damages. On appeal, the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Second District, denied the recovery for pain
and suffering but allowed punitive damages. The court found that
the statute clearly permits the survivor to recover for both lost sup-
port and services up to the date of his or her own death. Construing
the intent and purpose of the provision to be compensation for eco-
nomic loss to the temporarily surviving parent's estate, the Second
123. FLA. STAT. § 768.19 (1975).
124. FLA. STAT. § 768.17 (1975).
125. 336 So. 2d at 641.
126. 323 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
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District disallowed recovery for mental pain and suffering of the
parents during the same period for which recovery of lost support
and services was permitted. The court stated, however, that puni-
tive damages may be proper. Relying on the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Florida in Martin v. United Security Services, Inc.,"27 the
Second District found that the award of compensatory damages for
medical and funeral expenses was a "sufficient predicate for the jury
to consider the award of punitive damages in this action.' ' 128
Smyer v. Gaines29 contained two issues of importance in wrong-
ful death actions. In Smyer a woman was killed in an automobile
accident, and the personal representative filed a wrongful death
action seeking damages for the surviving husband and on behalf of
the deceased's parents. Prior to trial, the surviving husband remar-
ried, and the question arose to what extent such evidence was ad-
missible. The District Court of Appeal, First District, held that
although the Wrongful Death Act specifically provides that
"evidence of remarriage of the decedent's spouse is admissible,"'10
the evidence may not be considered in mitigation of any elements
of damages recoverable by the surviving spouse. The only purpose
for which such information is admitted is to divulge the whole truth.
The court was also faced with the issue of whether it would be
necessary for parents of a decedent to actually expend funds to hire
someone to perform services previously performed by the decedent
in order to recover for loss of such services in a wrongful death
action. The First District answered this question in the negative.
E. Attractive Nuisance
To hold a landowner liable for bodily harm to trespassing chil-
dren caused by an artificial condition maintained upon the land,
four elements must be present: (1) the landowner must know or
have reason to know that children are likely to trespass; (2) the
landowner must recognize that an unreasonable risk of death or
serious bodily harm exists; (3) the child, because of his youth, must
fail to discover the condition or not realize the danger involved; and
(4) the landowner's utility from maintaining the condition must be
127. 314 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1975).
128. 323 So. 2d at 643.
129. 332 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
130. FLA. STAT. § 768.21(6)(c) (1975).
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slight as compared to the risk to the children.'3
In Hayes v. Criterion Corp.'32 the parents of a child who was
killed in a construction drainage ditch brought a wrongful death
action against the corporation which had constructed the ditch. The
child died when a tunnel which he and other children had dug in
the ditch collapsed upon him. The ditch had been constructed adja-
cent to the subdivision in which the child lived by the corporate
defendant at the time of developing the subdivision. The corpora-
tion owned land on both sides of the ditch, and the land beyond the
ditch was unimproved at the time of the accident. Although the
corporation had erected a fence between the subdivision and the
ditch, there was no fence on the opposite side of the ditch facing the
open field.
The trial court entered a directed verdict for the defendant, and
on appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, affirmed.
In deciding whether the ditch constituted an attractive nuisance,
the appellate court assumed the existence of elements (1), (3), and
(4) mentioned above, and focused its attention on element (2). Con-
cluding that the ditch did not pose a hidden danger, the court held
that it did not constitute an attractive nuisance since the defendant
could not have been reasonably expected to foresee that children
might dig a tunnel into the side of the ditch so deep that it would
ultimately collapse on them. The court reasoned that "[t]o hold
that this drainage ditch constituted an attractive nuisance would
make landowners virtual insurers of the safety of all children who
happened to be playing in any drainage ditch in Florida."'33
F. Res Ipsa Loquitur
Florida courts have established three requirements for applica-
bility of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur: (1) the instrumentality
which caused the injury must have been within the exclusive control
of the defendant; (2) the injury was not the result of any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff; and (3) the acci-
dent would not have occurred had the defendant used due care.,3 4
131. Cockerham v. R.E. Vaughan, Inc., 82 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1955).
132. 337 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
133. Id. at 1029.
134. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hughes Supply, Inc., 336 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1976); Auto Specialties Mfg. Co. v. Boutwell, 335 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976); Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Street, 327 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976). Auto Specialties Mfg. Co. v.
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Although the doctrine is available in products liability cases, it
is reversible error for a trial court to fail to instruct the jury that if
it applies the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it must find that the
instrumentality which caused the injury was in "the exclusive con-
trol of the defendant at the time the negligent act or omission, if
any, must have occurred."'' 3 For the purposes of applying res ipsa
loquitur, control does not necessarily mean actual physical control
at the time of the injury; 3" it may be sufficient that the defendant
was in exclusive control at the time of the indicated negligence.,"
In an exploding bottle case, the injured plaintiff must show that
the bottle was not subjected to unusual atmospheric or temperature
changes and was not handled improperly after leaving the posses-
sion and control of the manufacturer.138 In Steele v. Royal Crown
Bottling Co. "I the District Court of Appeal, Third District, ex-
plained this requirement:
[A] plaintiff is not required to do the impossible by accounting
for every moment of a bottle's existence from the time it leaves a
defendant manufacturer's possession and control; it is enough if
he produces sufficient evidence of careful handling in general,
and of the absence of unusual incidents, to permit reasonable
persons on the jury to conclude that, more likely than not, the
explosion was due to the defendant's negligence.
The Steele case involved a suit by a grocery store customer against
a soft drink manufacturer for injuries sustained by the customer as
a result of a bottle expolsion. In checking out some groceries, the
customer had picked up the soft drink bottle in order to separate it
from her own purchases. The bottle shattered in her hand,
propelling pieces of glass into her eye. When the customer brought
an action alleging that the product was not safe for its intended
purpose and that the manufacturer was guilty of negligence, the
trial court directed a verdict in favor of the manufacturer. Deciding
Boutwell, 335 So. 2d 291, 292 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976), quoting Florida Standard Jury Instruction
4.6.
136. Yarbrough v. Ball U-Drive Sys., 48 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1950); Holman v. Ford Motor
Co., 239 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
137. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hughes Supply, Inc., 336 So. 2d 1221 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1976); Steele v. Royal Crown Cola Bottling Co., 335 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 39 (4th ed. 1971).
138. Groves v. Florida Coco-Cola Bottling Co., 40 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1949).
139. 335 So. 2d 586, 588 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976). See also Lauck v. Publix Mkt., Inc., 335
So. 2d 589 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied, the Third District
reversed the trial court's entry on final judgment.
In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hughes Supply, Inc. 40 the
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, liberally applied the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine in a case involving a tire blowout. A personal
injury action was brought against the tire's seller, who had installed
the tire on the plaintiff's truck. The tire blew out after having been
driven by the plaintiff for only one month and 9,520 miles, even
though the tire company's personnel had aggerted that tho tirp could
be expected to last for 80,000 to 120,000 miles. After the trial court
had entered final judgment for the plaintiff, the tire seller appealed,
contending that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was inapplicable be-
cause of the length of time the tire was out of its custody and the
long distance driven. The Fourth District, however, agreed with the
plaintiff's argument that sufficient evidence had been presented to
show that due care had been used in the handling and utilization
of the tire after it had left the possession of the tire company. Rea-
soning that "the law does not require an injured person to eliminate
each and every remote possibility of injury to the tire up to the time
of its explosion,"'"' the court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff.
In a well-reasoned dissent Judge Walden argued that since the
tire was not within the defendant's exclusive control at the time of
the blowout, the case should have been remanded for a new trial
without an instruction to the jury on res ipsa loquitur. His criticism
was that under the rationale of the majority opinion, "res ipsa loqui-
tur would be available in every products liability case, regardless of
possession and other classical criteria, so long as plaintiff testified
or produced evidence that plaintiff was not neglegent in the use of
the product."'4
A third case dealing with the question of control is Commercial
Union Insurance Co. v. Street.' In deciding whether res ipsa loqui-
tur could be the basis for an elevator company's liability in a per-
sonal injury action, the District Court of Appeal, Second District,
was confronted with a case of first impression for the Florida courts.
The elevator company had manufactuted and installed an elevator
in a hospital, and the maintenance agreement stipulated that the
140. 336 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
141. Id. at 1224.
142. Id.
143. 327 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
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hospital was in possession and control of the elevator. Despite this
agreement, the elevator company in fact maintained the hospital
elevator. The Second District held that res ipsa loquitur is applica-
ble to a defendant who manufactures, installs, and maintains an
automatic passenger elevator even though the maintenance con-
tract stipulates that possession and control pass to the building
owner. Stating that "[t]he crucial point is the actual control of the
elevator system, rather than the contractual agreement,"'" the
court suggested that a different result might be reached where the
elevator is manufactured, installed, and maintained by different
parties.
G. Comparative Negligence
In establishing comparative negligence as the law of Florida,
the supreme court purposely left open many questions regarding the
practical application of that doctrine.' In Santiesteban v.
McGrath'" the trial judge directed a verdict for the plaintiff solely
on the issue of liability. At the same time, the judge instructed the
jury to consider the plaintiff's negligence and to reduce the damages
in proportion to the amount the plaintiff was at fault. In response
to special interrogatories, the jury stated that the plaintiff had been
ten percent negligent and the defendant ninety percent negligent
while the total amount of damages incurred by the plaintiff was
$6,000.
On appeal to the District Court of Appeal, Third District, the
plaintiff contended that once the court gave a directed verdict find-
ing the defendant negligent, it was precluded from submitting the
issue of the plaintiff's negligence to the jury. The Third District
affirmed the trial court's instruction and held that the trial judge's
directed verdict only determined as a matter of law that the defen-
dant's negligence was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries, but not
necessarily the sole legal cause.
The proper use of special verdicts and special interrogatories in
cases involving comparative negligence has been difficult to ascer-
tain. Hoffman v. Jones'47 specifically authorized the use of special
verdicts for apportioning damages on the basis of relative degrees
144. Id. at 114.
145. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 439 (Fla. 1973).
146. 320 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
147. 280 So. 2d 431, 439 (Fla. 1973).
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of fault. However, the supreme court in Lincenberg v. Issen'" cau-
tioned that special verdicts on the issue of the relative degrees of
fault between joint tortfeasors are not dispositive of the issue of
contribution, but may be used to assist the trial judge in performing
his equity responsibility. Whether special verdicts must be submit-
ted when requested in order to compare the negligence of a plaintiff
and defendant was decided in Florida East Coast Railway v.
Lawrence.4 ' After examining the Hoffman and Lincenberg cases,
the works of several commentators, and authority from other states,
the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that if contribu-
tory negligence is at isssue, special verdicts should be required at
the timely request of any party or at the discretion of the court.
Believing that the issue is one of great public interest, however, the
court certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida."'
H. Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors
1. LEGISLATION
In 1975 the Florida Legislature passed the Uniform Contribu-
tion Among Tortfeasors Act, 5 ' which provides a joint tortfeasor who
has paid more that his pro rata share of the liability the right to seek
contribution from other joint tortfeasors. 5 ' The 1975 law made it
clear that in assessing a joint tortfeasor's pro rata share of the liabil-
ity, the relative degrees of fault were not to be considered.'52 Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court of Florida in Lincenberg v. Issen,"5
decided that special interrogatory verdict forms attempting to allo-
cate a percentage of fault among several joint tortfeasors generally
should not be permitted. The Lincenberg court also said that joint
148. 318 So. 2d 386, 393 (Fla. 1975).
149. 328 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
149.1. Subsequent to the writing of this article, but prior to the final printing of this
issue, the Supreme Court of Florida decided, in response to the certified question, that special
verdicts shall be required in all jury trials involving comparative negligence. Furthermore,
in nonjury trials, the court should make finding of record required by special verdicts. The
court also held that the decision was to be applied prospectively only. Lawrence v. Florida
East Coast Ry. Co., - So. 2d - (Fla. 1977).
150. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1975), as amended by 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-186 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (Supp. 1976).
151. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(g) (1975).
152. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(a) (1975), as amended by 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-186 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(a) (Supp. 1976).
153. 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975).
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and several liability was retained under the Act.'54 The jury would
be required to apportion the relative degrees of fault between the
plaintiff on the one hand and the several defendants as a group on
the other. Each defendant found liable would be jointly and sever-
ally liable for the entire amount of damages but could seek contribu-
tion in equal shares from other tortfeasors if he had paid more than
his pro rata share of the liability. This result seemed inconsistent
with the apportionment principles established by the Supreme
Court of Florida in Hoffman v. Jones,5' and it has been criticized
by commentators as well as by members of the bar.'56
The 1976 Florida Legislature responded to this criticism by
amending Florida Statutes section 769.31(3)(a) to read: "[The joint
tortfeasors'] relative degrees of fault shall be the basis for allocation
of liability."'' 7 Joint and several liability still exists under the new
law, but now, if one of two joint tortfeasors is adjudged to be only
15% at fault and he has paid to a faultless plaintiff the entire
amount of damages, he may recover the excess 85% from the other
joint tortfeasor rather than 50% as was permitted under the former
law. Special interrogatories now seem to be necessary so that proper
allocations of fault can be determined; The part of the Lincenberg
opinion cautioning against their use has been impliedly superseded
by this statutory amendment. The 1976 legislative change brings
more order and consistency to Florida's apportionment system:
Each person will pay the proportion of the total damages he has
caused the other party unless one joint tortfeasor is execution proof
or cannot be joined in the action.'
2. CASE LAW
Although the right to contribution among joint tortfeasors has
been firmly established by the legislature and the courts, 5 ' a ques-
tion arises as to whether contribution may be sought from a joint
154. It has been asserted that the Lincenberg case actually presented the issue of
whether joint and several liability should be preserved and the court's summary treatment
of that issue while focusing on the collateral issue of contribution was unfortunate. 30 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 747, 755-59 (1976).
155. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
156. See, e.g., Comment, The Case for Comparative Contribution in Florida, 30 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 713 (1976); 30 U. MIAMi L. Rlv. 747 (1976).
157. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-186, § 1 (amending FA. STAT. § 768.31(3) (a) (1975).
158. See 30 U. MIAMI L. REv. 747, 759 n.** (1975).
159. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (Supp. 1976); Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975).
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tortfeasor who is not directly liable to the plaintiff because of some
form of immunity. For example, would contribution be allowed from
an alleged joint tortfeasor who is the husband and parent of the
injured plaintiffs, even though he would be immune from direct
suit? Furthermore, would an employer be liable to a third-party
tortfeasor for contribution as a result of injuries to an employee if
the employee's action against the employer is limited by the Work-
men's Compensation Act?
The District Court of Appeal, First District, recently has an-
swered both of these questions in the negative. In Mieure v. Moore6 '
the plaintiff was driving an automobile occupied by his wife and
children when he ran into a tractor-trailer which allegedly was
parked negligently. When Moore and his family sought damages for
their injuries, the defendant filed a counterclaim and a third-party
complaint seeking contribution from Moore.
The court noted that it was well established in Florida that
spouses may not sue each other, nor may minor children sue their
parents in tort. 6' The court examined the statutory language in the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act which provides for
contribution only when two or more persons become jointly or sever-
ally liable in tort for the same injury to a person.' Deciding that
Moore was not a joint tortfeasor since he would not be liable in tort
for the same injury to his wife and children, the First District af-
firmed the trial court's dismissal of the action for contribution.
In dictum the First District noted that the intra-family immun-
ity doctrine might be inconsistent with the more recent comparative
negligence and contribution among joint tortfeasors doctrines. The
latter doctrines apportion damages according to relative degrees of
fault, whereas the former allows negligent tortfeasors who are re-
lated to the injured party to escape liability. The court stated, how-
ever, that only the Supreme Court of Florida had the authority to
overrule such precedent.'
In United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Gulf Power Co.' a supplier of
natural gas sought indemnity and contribution from its customer for
the fatal injuries sustained by employees of that customer as a result
160. 330 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
161. See, e.g., Orefice v. Albert, 237 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1970).
162. FtA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(a) (Supp. 1976).
163. 330 So. 2d 546, 547 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
164. 334 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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of a gas explosion during the course of their employment. The wid-
ows of the employees received full workmen's compensation benefits
from the employer-customer and then sued the supplier on the
theory that it was negligent in failing to odorize the gas.
Applying the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Noa v.
United Gas Pipeline Co.,' 5 the First District found that a gas sup-
plier had a nondelegable duty to odorize the gas delivered to its
customer and that failure to do so was active negligence. Therefore,
no indemnity would lie. With respect to the claim for contribution,
the court again examined the statutory language: "The right of
contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more
than his pro rata share of the common liability"'6 and "[the right
exists] when two or more persons become jointly or severally lia-
ble."' 7 The court held that because the legislature had established
workmen's compensation benefits as the sole liability of an em-
ployer, while the supplier's liability was based upon common law
negligence, there could be'no "common liability" between the em-
ployer and supplier to the deceased employees' families. Thus the
action for contribution against the employer was dismissed. More-
over, the court stated that its holding followed the majority rule
among the states.' 6
The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act provides
that if a plaintiff executes a release to one of several joint tortfea-
sors, it discharges the released tortfeasor from all liability for contri-
bution to any of the other tortfeasors16 9 The Act also states that the
release of one tortfeasor does not discharge any other tortfeasors
from liability unless its terms so provide. 7 ' However, if there has
been a specific release of certain parties which includes the phrase,
"and any and all other persons and/or corporations who are or may
be liable for injuries or damages sustained as a result of the subject
accident," then the court may dismiss the action against all alleged
joint tortfeasors.1
165. 305 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1974).
166. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(b) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
167. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(a) (Supp. 1976).
168. See Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 977, 985 (1957).
169. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(5)(b) (Supp. 1976); see-Hester v. Gatlin, 322 So. 2d 660 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1976); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Gordon, 328 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
170. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(5)(a) (Supp. 1976).
171. Hester v. Gatlin, 332 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976); Dean v. Lifter, 336 So. 2d 393
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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Johnson v. Ludwig' peripherally involved several of the issues
discussed above. A driver of a leased automobile drove into a second
vehicle which was stationary on a highway. The second vehicle was
propelled into a third automobile and injured the plaintiff, who had
been standing between the second and third cars. The plaintiff sued
the driver of the first automobile and the company from which it
was leased as well as their insurance carriers, alleging that the
driver's negligence was reckless and wanton.
The leasing company filed a cross-claim against its lessee for
indemnity. After the lessor settled with the plaintiff, the plaintiff
executed a release discharging the liability of the lessor and its
insurance carrier and "any other person, corporation . . . charged
with responsibility for injuries to [plaintiff] . . . on or about the
[date of accident]." The lessee-driver, anticipating his indemnity
obligation to the lessor, filed a cross-claim for contribution against
the driver of one of the cars involved.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, found that on its
face the claim for contribution did not state a cause of action. How-
ever, the court said that on remand the trial court should determine
several issues including: (1) whether the lessee's liability for in-
demnity would entitle him to be classified as a "tortfeasor who has
paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability"; (2) what
effect the release would have on cross-defendants who were not par-
ties to the plaintiff's action; (3) whether the lessee was guilty of
wanton conduct; and (4) whether the cross-defendant was guilty of
negligence. Assuming that the payment to the lessor would be in
excess of the lessee's pro rata share of the liability, that the lessee
was not wanton so as to prohibit his recovering for contribution,'
and that the cross-defendant was negligent, the action for contribu-
tion still might be inappropriate because Florida Statutes section
768.31(5)(a) (Supp. 1976) possibly could bar a claim for contribu-
tion where the release included a general clause regarding "any
other person." The District Court of Appeal, Second District, found
in Hester v. Gatlin' that such a "catch-all" clause in the release
did preclude an action for contribution by one of three alleged joint
tortfeasors against the others even though the release specifically
named only two of the three alleged tortfeasors.
172. 328 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
173. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(c) (Supp. 1976).
174. 332 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
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It is fairly common for a defendant to seek contribution or, in
the alternative, indemnity. However, if a defendant's third-party
complaint expressly seeks only indemnity, but in effect states a
cause of action for contribution, the court may allow an action for
contribution in the event indemnity would not lie. In Lindsey v.
Austin,' for example, a patient filed a medical malpractice action
against a surgeon who had removed a corn from the patient's toe.
Subsequently, infection, osteomyelitis, and gangrene resulted in the
necessary amputation of the toe. The surgeon filed a third-party
complaint against the doctor who had treated the toe after the surgi-
cal removal of the corn.
The complaint alleged that the surgeon was at most a passive
tortfeasor, that the other doctor was the active tortfeasor, and spe-
cifically asked for indemnification. The trial court dismissed the
action for indemnity. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, reversed and found the complaint stated a valid action for
contribution although it did not state an action for indemnity. The
complaint's language, "whatever responsibility for damages, if any,
may be ultimately determined by a jury, would be limited to the
initial surgery," was sufficient for a contribution claim since it
would be up to the jury to determine the extent of liability as be-
tween the two doctors. This case should not be read as saying that
anytime a third-party complaint alleges indemnity, an action for
contribution will lie. However, if the facts alleged in the complaint
are sufficient for a contribution suit, the complaint will withstand
a motion to dismiss which is based on the ground that
"contribution" is not specificially requested.
I. Indemnity
Like contribution, indemnity permits a relatively innocent tort-
feasor who has paid money to the plaintiff to recover from one or
more other joint tortfeasors. Unlike contribution, however, indemn-
ity permits recovery of the entire amount paid and is not based on
allocating a portion of the fault to each of the joint tortfeasors. 76 The
most common indemnity actions arise out of vicarious liability
suits; for example, the owner of an automobile who is held
175. 336 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
176. See VTN Consol. v. Coastal Eng'r Assocs., 341 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976);
Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 302 So. 2d 187, 190 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974.
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responsible for the driver's negligence under the dangerous instru-
mentality doctrine can seek indemnity from the driver,' 7 or an em-
ployer who is held responsible for the actions of his employees acting
within the scope of their employment under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior might seek idemnity from the employee. Courts have
also created an action for indemnity if one of the tortfeasors is
"passively" negligent whereas another is "actively" negligent. 7
This active-passive distinction was created to avoid harshness since
there was no common law right to contribution between tortfea-
sors. 179 Some cases, which may be distortions of the contribution
doctrine, have permitted a tortfeasor to receive indemnification
from a doctor who aggravated the injury during the course of treat-
ment. 80 It is also clear that one may contract for a right of indemn-
ity.
The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act specifically
states that "this act does not impair any right of indemnity under
existing law."'' Therefore, the active-passive distinction is still via-
ble and in the proper case may establish complete indemnification.
This principle was recognized in Florida Power Corp. v. Taylor.182
There an employee of a contractor was injured when he attempted
to measure the distance between the ground and a high voltage
transmission line by extending a surveyor's rod near the power line.
An action was brought against the power company, which in turn
filed a third-party complaint against the contractor and the canal
authority for indemnity and contribution. The trial court entered
summary judgment against the power company on the third-party
action. The power company's indemnity argument was based on
passive negligence and on a provision contained in the conveyance
177. See, e.g., Roth v. Cannel, 242 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Roth v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1972); Fincher Motor Sales, Inc.,
v. Lakin, 156 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963); Hutchins v. Campbell, Inc., 123 So. 2d 273 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1960).
178. See, e.g., Maybarduk v. Bustamante, 294 So.2d 374 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974); Winn-
Dixie Stores, Inc.'v. Fellows, 153 So.2d 45 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963), modified sub nom. Winn-
Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 160 So. 2d (Fla. 1964).
179. See Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 302 So. 2d 187, 191 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974). See also Dole
v. Dow-Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 150; 282 N.E.2d 288, 293, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 388 (1972);
Note, Toward a Workable Rule of Contribution in the Federal Courts, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 123,
125 (1965).
180. Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 302 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
181. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(f) (Supp. 1976).
182. 332 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
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to the canal authority of property in which the power company
retained an easement. The provision stated that any roads built by
or for the canal authority should be no closer than twenty-five feet
from the power lines. The road in question had been raised about
six feet in violation of the restrictions. The power company con-
tended that the injury was a direct result of the negligence in build-
ing up the road so that it was six feet closer to the power lines, and
at most the power company was passively negligent in failing to
discover the dangerous condition which was caused by the canal
authority.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, decided that if
the power company had actual notice of the condition it would be
actively negligent and would be denied indemnity. The court stated
that if, however, there was no actual knowledge on the part of the
power company, it might give rise to an inference that its negli-
gence, if any, was passive. Thus, the decision whether the power
company's negligence was active or passive depended on whether
the power company actually knew of the elevation; therefore, the
court held that a question of fact existed, and summary judgment
should not have been granted.
An action for indemnity may lie even if the original complaint
characterizes the initial defendant's activities as constituting the
active negligence. In Crawford Door Sales Co. v. Donahue"3 the
plaintiff was injured when a door fell on her. Plaintiff sued both the
installer and the manufacturer of the door. The complaint against
the installer alleged active negligence and the cross-claim by the
installer against the manufacturer alleged that the manufacturer
was actively negligent and that the installer should be indemnified.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, held that the cross-
claim stated a valid cause of action, relying on the Third District's
opinion in Central Truck Lines, Inc. v. White Motor Corp. I'l and on
the general purpose of third-party practice of avoiding two suits if
they can be tried together.
If it cannot be demonstrated that the negligent acts of several
parties, each owing a duty to the plaintiff, were separable in time
or effect, and the responsibilities of the parties could not be stipu-
lated, then an action for indemnification will be dismissed. In
183. 321 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
184. 316 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
19771
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Leesburg Hospital Association v. Carter"5 a patient filed a malprac-
tice action against a hospital because she suffered a heart attack
from lack of proper care while in the hospital. The hospital filed a
third-party complaint against a doctor who was not an employee of
the hospital on theories of indemnification and contribution. The
plaintiff contended that the hospital personnel negligently disre-
garded the results of certain tests performed on the patient and
failed to call a physician when her vital signs became critical. The
hospital alleged that the doctor (third-party defendant) was negle-
gent in leaving the patient unattended during the time he was per-
forming surgery on another patient and that he failed to respond to
calls notifying him of the plaintiff's worsening condition. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Second District, held that the complaint for
indemnification could not be sustained on an active-passive theory,
for both the doctor and hospital were allegedly guilty of active negli-
gence. Furthermore, the court discussed the rationale of Stuart v.
Hertz Corp.,"' in which the Fourth District allowed indemnity
where a physician aggravated injuries previously caused by another.
Although the facts of the two cases seemed similar, the Leesburg
court distinguished Hertz in that the latter involved acts committed
"against the plaintiff which were demonstrably separate in time and
effect."'87 In Leesburg the acts were closer in time and combined to
produce a single injury such that the defendants were joint tortfea-
sors. Hence, only an action for contribution was permitted.
J. Assumption of Risk
Comparative negligence has been in effect in Florida since
1973.188 Nevertheless, more than three years later, it is still uncertain
whether assumption of risk is a complete bar to a plaintiff's action
or whether it merely reduces his damages in proportion to his own
fault, as does contributory negligence. In Rea v. Leadership Hous-
ing, Inc. I the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, had held
that the distinction between contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk was inconsequential. The Fourth District recently reaf-
185. 321 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
186. 302 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
187. 321 So. 2d 433, 434 (Fla. 2nd Dist. 1975).
188. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
189. 312 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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firmed that holding in Trammel v. Reliance Insurance Co.'
The District Court of Appeal, First District, followed the
Fourth District's lead and held in Parker v. Maule Industries, Inc. 9
that assumption of risk should be merged with contributory negli-
gence and be used to reduce a plaintiff's damages in proportion to
his degree of fault." 2 The First District again held in Manassa v.
New Hampshire Insurance Co.' that giving an instruction on as-
sumption of risk was error. Similarly, the Second District found in
Hall v. Holton'94 that assumption of risk had merged with the con-
cept of comparative negligence.
The Third District, however, previously had decided in Dorta
v. Blackburn' that the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida
in Hoffman v. Jones' was silent on the issue and noted that other
jurisdictions employing comparative negligence retained the de-
fense of assumption of risk. Therefore, the court concluded that the
doctrine was still valid as a complete defense in a negligence action.
Although the First and Fourth Districts subsequently held to the
contrary, the. Third District recently noted in Weedman v. Sunland
Roller Rink, Inc. "I that it would continue to treat assumption of risk
as a complete bar to recovery until the Supreme Court of Florida
ruled to the contrary.
Such a conflict among the Districts should be reconciled by the
Supreme Court of Florida. Although the supreme court has not
actually addressed the issue, one might read certain language in
West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. ' as indicating that assumption of
risk would not constitute a complete bar to recovery. There the issue
was what constitutes a valid defense in strict liability cases. The
supreme court stated:
The defendant manufacturer may assert that the plaintiff was
negligent in some specified manner other than failing to discover
or guard against a defect, such as assuming the risk, or misusing
the product, and that such negligence was a substantial proxi-
190. 328 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
191. 321 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
192. Id. at 107.
193. 332 So. 2d 34 (Fla. lst Dist. 1976).
194. 330 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
195. 302 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 3d Dist.1974).
196. 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
197. 323 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
198. 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
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mate cause of the plaintiffs injuries or damages. The fact that
plaintiff acts or fails to act as a reasonable prudent person, and
such conduct proximately contributes to his injury, constitutes a
valid defense. In other words, lack of ordinary due care could
constitute a defense to strict tort liability.
We now have comparative negligence, so the defense of con-
tributory negligence is avialable in determining the apportion-
ment of the negligence by the manufacturer of the alleged defec-
tive product and the negligent use made thereof by the consumer.
The ordinary rules of causation and the defenses applicable to
negligence are available under our adoption of the Restatement
rule. If this were not so, this Court would, in effect, abolish the
adoption of comparative negligence.'"
The principles involved in the above quoted language tend to indi-
cate that the supreme court would more likely than not decide that
assumption of risk should be uged to apportion, rather than bar, the
plaintiff's recovery. Since the conflict among the districts is likely
to continue, it is important that the supreme court address itself
specifically to this issue."
Although recognizing assumption of risk as a complete defense
in an appropriate case, the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
noted that in order to be guilty of assumption of risk, one not only
must know of the existence of a condition which constitutes peril
but also must be aware of and appreciate the danger and voluntarily
expose himself to the risk. In Alexander v. Fiftieth St. Heights,
Co. 00 a lessee of an apartment was injured in an explosion involving
gas passing through an uncapped pipe which entered her apart-
ment. The lessee had occupied the apartment for 2 1/2 months and
was aware that the pipe entered her apartment. The District Court
of Appeal, Third District, found that the lessee was not shown to
have been guilty of assumption of risk, absent some indication that
she actually was aware of and appreciated the danger of a possible
explosion, and that if such apprehension existed, she voluntarily
submitted herself to such risks.
199. Id. at 90 (emphasis added).
199.1. Subsequent to the writing of this article, but prior to the final printing of this
issue, the Supreme Court of Florida resolved this conflict among the districts by holding that
the affirmative defense of implied assumption of risk is merged into the defense of contribu-
tory negligence and that principles of comparative negligence will apply in all cases where
such defense is raised. Blackburn v. Dorta, - So. 2d - (Fla. 1977).
200. 334 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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K. Damages
1. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The issue of whether a jury should be allowed to consider an
award of punitive damages where a defendant's negligence is cou-
pled with intoxication was decided by the Supreme Court of Florida
in Ingram v. Pettit.'"' Except for conflicting evidence of whether the
defendant applied his brakes before his car struck the rear of the
plaintiff's vehicle, there was no evidence that the defendant had
been driving abnormally prior to the collision. As the supreme court
noted, the case was before it solely because the defendant had sub-
mitted to a breathalizer test which showed his blood alcohol content
to be .26% on a scale in which the legal presumption of intoxication
arises at .10%. 102
Placing a heavy emphasis on the state policy that drunken
drivers are a menace to public safety and are to be discouraged by
punishment,203 the court stated as its ratio decidendi:
[W]e hold that juries may award punitive damages where volun-
tary intoxication is involved in an automotive accident in Florida
without regard to external proof of carelessness or abonormal
driving, provided always the traditional elements for punitive
liability are proved, including proximate causation and an under-
lying award of compensatory damages. We do not hold that intox-
ication coupled with negligence will always justify an award of
punitive damages. We affirmatively hold that the voluntary act
of driving "while intoxicated" evinces, without more, a suffi-
ciently reckless attitude for a jury to be asked to provide an award
of punitive damages if it determines liability exists for compensa-
tory damages. 04
The supreme court stated further that the term "intoxicated," as
used within the decision, is equivalent to the degree of intoxication
required in Florida Statutes section 860.01 (1975) pertaining to au-
tomobile manslaughter.
201. 340 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1976).
202. FLA. STAT. § 322.262(2)(c) (1975).
203. The majority opinion stated: "Driving in an intoxicated condition is an intentional
act which creates known risks to the public. We believe that the potentiality of an adverse
award of punitive damages is a suitable corollary to those criminal laws designed to discour-
age this reckless disregard for the public safety." 340 So. 2d at 925.
204. Id. at 924.
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As pointed out in the dissenting opinion, the scope of the major-
ity's holding appears somewhat unclear-its wording geemg to suffer
from some degree of internal inconsistency:
The majority opinion. . . says that the traditional elements such
as proximate causation and an underlying award of compensa-
tory damages must still be proved. But what does this
mean-that the accident caused injury or that the intoxication,
without more, caused the accident to occur? If the latter, then the
position is untenable in a situation such as we have at bar where
there is no evidence at all that the intoxication caused any irregu-
larities in the operation of the vehicle. If the former, then, not-
withstanding the lip service paid to it, the concept of proximate
causation has gone by the boards.10 5
The dissenting opinion suggested that the majority had, in effect,
extended the strict liability concept to the recovery of punitive dam-
ages. Thus, it concluded that under the majority holding an injured
party need only show the occurrence of an accident and evidence of
intoxication in order to subject a defendant to the assessment of
punitive damages.
2. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
The Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act provides that
any person injured in an automobile accident who suffers perma-
nent disfigurement "may recover damages in tort for pain, suffering,
mental anguish and inconvenience"; 0 however, the Act fails to de-
fine the word "disfigurement." In Gillman v. Gillman'7 the District
Court of Appeal, First District, held that a permanent scar may
constitute permanent disfigurement within the meaning of the stat-
ute. The question whether a particular scar is a disfigurement is one
of fact and when properly placed in issue may not be decided by
summary judgment.
In a recent Second District case it was held that the right of a
person to seek damages for the loss of the services of his or her
spouse is not limited to those services which customarily arise out
of the marital relationship. 0 In the absence of a double recovery, a
spouse may recover the reasonable value of services customarily
205. Id. at 926.
206. FLA. STAT. §. 627.737 (1975).
207. 319 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
208. Rumsey v. Manning, 335 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
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performed without compensation in that spouse's business by the
other spouse, where such services are lost by reason of injuries suf-
fered in an accident caused by a third party. 209
III. STRICT LIABILITY
A. Strict Products Liability in Tort
The Supreme Court of Florida officially adopted the concept of
strict products liability in tort in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.210
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit21' had
certified questions to the Supreme Court of Florida concerning the
state's law regarding a manufacturer's strict liability in tort, as
distinguished from breach of warranty of merchantability, for injury
to a bystander or user of a product. Additionally, the Fifth Circuit
asked what sort of conduct, if any, would create a defense of contri-
butory or comparative negligence to either a strict liability action
or one based on breach of implied warranty.
The West case arose out of a wrongful death action against the
manufacturer of a "caterpillar grader." A construction company
had been operating the grader on a street when it struck Mrs. West,
causing severe internal injuries which resulted in her death several
days later. Evidently, Mrs. West had been standing on a street
corner talking to a friend and waiting for a bus when the grader
passed her going forward. A few minutes later the bus approached,
and Mrs. West began to cross the street to meet it when she was
struck down by the grader, which was now working its way back
down the street in reverse. There was evidence that Mrs. West had
looked to the left before crossing the street and had been looking in
her purse as she crossed the intersection. At no time did she look to
the right so as to see the grader. Plaintiff settled with the construc-
tion company prior to the trial. The wrongful death action against
the manufacturer was grounded on two counts. The first was a claim
of negligent design in that there was no audible warning system
when the grader was in reverse, there was an inadequate rear view
mirror, and there was a blind spot when the grader was operated in
209. Id.
210. 336. So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976). In Linder v. Combustion Eng'r. Inc., - So. 2d
(Fla. 1977), the supreme court set forth rules regarding the application of strict liability to
pending litigation.
211. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 504 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1974). The case was in federal
court pursuant to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.
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reverse. The second was a claim for breach of implied warranty or
strict liability based on the same alleged design defects.
The federal district judge instructed the jury on three possible
theories of recovery: negligence, breach of implied warranty of mer-
chantability, and strict liability in tort. Furthermore, the court in-
structed the jury to consider whether Mrs. West's actions consti-
tuted contributory negligence, but it failed to give an instruction on
assumption of risk.
The jury returned a verdict against the manufacturer. In re-
sponse to special interrogatories, the jury found that the manufac-
turer was liable on all three counts, that the damages totaled
$125,000, and that Mrs. West's negligence contributed to the acci-
dent to the extent of thirty-five percent. The trial judge refused to
apply comparative negligence principles on the ground that contri-
butory negligence was not a defense to a strict liability action and
awarded the full amount to the plaintiff, less the amount received
in settlement with the construction company."' The defendant ap-
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
which led to the certification to the Supreme Court of Florida.
The supreme court examined in detail the state's decisions in
products liability suits and concluded that, in effect, the Florida
courts have imposed strict or absolute liability on manufacturers for
placing products on the market knowing they would be used without
inspection for defects which cause injury to persons. Therefore, the
court concluded that the prior decisions were "in conformity with
the principles set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §
402A13 . . . .[and] [s]uch a recognition by the Court is no great
new departure from present law and, in most instances, accom-
plishes a change of nomenclature."2 '4
212. Plaintiff settled with the construction company prior to trial for $35,000. Therefore
the judgment against Caterpillar Tractor Co. was $90,000 ($125,000 - $35,000).
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the
seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected
to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condi-
tion in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exer-
cised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the
user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller.
214. 336 So. 2d at 86.
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Although specifically adopting the doctrine of strict liability as
stated by section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, the supreme
court went one step further by holding such doctrine also protects
reasonably foreseeable bystanders as well as consumers or users of
the product."'
Having decided that a manufacturer may be found liable under
strict liability in tort, as distinguished from implied warranty of
merchantability, the court considered whether the defense of contri-
butory or comparative negligence should be permitted under either
theory. With respect to defenses to a strict liability action, the su-
preme court referred to the comments of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts section 402A and held that:
Contributory negligence of the user or consumer or bystander in
the sense of a failure to discover a defect, or to guard against the
possibility of its existence, is not a defense. Contributory negli-
gence of the consumer or user by unreasonable use of a product
after discovery of the defect and the danger is a valid defense
.. . . The fact that plaintiff acts or fails to act as a reasonable
prudent person, and such conduct proximately contributes to his
injury, constitutes a valid defense. In other words, the lack of
ordinary due care could constitute a defense to strict tort liabil-
ity.216
Noting that Florida has adopted the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence, the supreme court held that apportionment should apply in
actions where contributory negligence is a defense to strict liability.
Finally, the supreme court held that contributory negligence is a
defense in an action for breach of an implied warranty of merchant-
ability. Therefore, whether suit is brought in strict liability or for
breach of an implied warranty, the injured person is required to
show he has exercised ordinary due care. The court examined but
rejected the argument that since contributory negligence is a tort
defense and breach of implied warranty is a contract action, contri-
butory negligence should not be applied to an implied warranty
case.
217
One possible problem in adopting the doctrine of strict liability
in tort is the potential conflict with the warranty and disclaimer
215. The Restatement (Second) of Torts had left open the question of whether nonusers
or nonconsumers should be permitted recovery in strict liability.
216. 336 So. 2d at 90.
217. Id. at 91-92.
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provisions"' of the Uniform Commercial Code. Strict liability would
eliminate the notice requirement," 9 restrict the effectiveness of dis-
claimers," and abolish what is left of the privity requirement. 22'
However, the supreme court found that since the legislature had not
specified that the UCC remedies were exclusive, there should be no
impediment to adoption of the strict liability doctrine.
In products liability actions against manufacturers, both strict
liability and breach of implied warranty may be pleaded, as well as
traditional allegations of negligence. To hold a manufacturer liable
under strict liability in tort, the plaintiff must demonstrate the
manufacturer's connection to the allegedly defective product, prove
that the product is defective and unreasonably dangerous, and es-
tablish the proximate causal connection between the defect and the
ultimate injuries or damages suffered by the plaintiff. With the
adoption of strict liability, one might question the necessity of also
pleading breach of implied warranty of merchantability since dis-
claimers of merchantability are not a defense to strict liability,22
and there are no notice or privity requirements in a strict liability
cause of action. If the standard of strict liability ("defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his prop-
erty") is the same as "unmerchantability," then there would seem
to be no purpose in alleging implied warranty; but if the strict
liability standard is more difficult to prove, then an allegation of
breach of warranty would continue to be useful. However, the su-
preme court in West suggested that the standard of "defect unrea-
sonably dangerous" did not introduce a notion different than that
of "unmerchantability. ' ' 2 3 Future case law must determine whether
the two standards are necessarily the same.
B. Animals
Florida's "dog bite" statute 2 makes a dog owner, with certain
exceptions, the insurer against damage by his dog. In Harris v.
218. See FLA. STAT. §§ 672.314-.316 (1975).
219. FLA. STAT. § 672.602(1) (1975).
220. "[D]isclaimers [would be restricted] to situations where it can be reasonably said
that the consumer has fully assumed the risk. ... 336 So. 2d at 88.
221. FLA. STAT. § 672.318 (1975).
222. See note 220 supra.
223. 336 So. 2d at 88.
224. FLA. STAT. § 767.04 (1975).
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Moriconi25 the issue was whether a child's actions constituted
"carelessly provoking" the dog, thus giving the owner a defense
under the statute. A 51/2-year-old child, legally on the dog-
owner's property, accidentally rode her bicycle over the dog's tail.
When the child returned to comfort the dog, it bit her on the face
causing injury. An action was brought against the dog's owner
pursuant to Florida Statutes section 767.04 (1975) to recover dam-
ages.
There was no evidence of mischievous aggravation; therefore,
the issue was whether the child's actions were "careless" within the
meaning of the statute. The District Court of Appeal, First District,
held that "careless," as used in the dog bite statute, was synony-
mous with the definition of negligence. Therefore, since the child
was under the age of siX,228 her actions 'could not be "careless" or
"negligent," and the dog owner would be absolutely liable. Judge
Rawls dissented on the grounds that the statute should control over
common law, and the statutory exception regarding careless or mis-
chievous action specifically contemplates "any person," including
a child.
The general provision holding dog owners liable "for any dam-
age done by their dogs to sheep or other domestic animals or live-
stock, or to persons"' " was the subject of litigation in Smith v.
Allison.2 8 The plaintiff was riding his motorcycle on the street with
a car approaching him from the opposite direction when he observed
in the middle of the road a dog which suddenly ran in front of him.
In attempting to avoid hitting the dog, the plaintiff crashed his
motorcycle and received injuries. Suit was brought against the de-
fendant, who had custody of the dog. The dog was actually owned
by the defendant's parents.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the
statute was inapplicable in the present case. The court noted that
the statute's original intent was to protect an agrarian society and
that although it had approved the statute's application in a case
where a dog ran into a car, ' it decided that there must be some
limitation on the scope of absolute liability for damages caused by
225. 331 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st. Dist. 1976).
226. See Swindell v. Hellkamp, 242 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1970).
227. FLA. STAT. § 767.01 (1975) (emphasis added).
228. 332 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
229. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Greenstein, 308 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
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animals. Therefore, since the dog itself did not inflict any damage,
the court refused to apply absolute liability. Moreover, the Third
District cautioned that the element of ownership is "of immense
importance in actions such as this one" 3 and noted there is a clear
burden on the plaintiff to show actual ownership and not merely
possession or custody. 31
In response to this ruling, the plaintiff contended the cause
should have been submitted to the jury as a negligence case based
on a Metropolitan Dade County Ordinance 232 ordering those who
have custody of dogs to prevent them from running stray on the
streets. On rehearing, the court stated that an inference that the
defendant was negligent was not justified merely because the dog
was on the street. Furthermore, there was evidence that the dog was
regularly kept inside a fenced yard but had somehow escaped on the
date of the accident. Therefore, the court affirmed its prior deci-
233sion.
IV. GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY
A. Municipal Corporations
The scope of municipal sovereign immunity is presently unset-
tled in Florida.234 The uncertainty which encompasses this area
emanates from two sources. The first source of this confusion is the
state supreme court decisions of Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach3'
and Modlin v. City of Miami Beach,"' coupled with the subsequent
cases attempting to intepret them. The second source arises from
the still uncertain effect of the recently enacted Florida statute237
230. 332 So. 2d at 634.
231. See Reid v. Nelson, 154 F.2d 724 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 716 (1946).
232. METRo DADE CO., CODE § 5-6 (1959) provides in pertinent part:
(a) No responsible party owning or having possession, charge, custody or control
of any dog shall cause or permit or allow the dog to stray, run, be, go or in any
other manner to be at large in or upon any public street, sidewalk or park or on
private property of others without the express or implied consent of the owner of
such private property. This section shall not apply to any dog or dogs when the
dog is actually engaged in the sport of hunting in authorized areas and supervised
by a competent person.
233. 332 So. 2d at 634-35.
234. See Seligman & Beals, The Sovereignty of Florida Municipalities: In-Again, Out-
Again, When-Again, 50 FLA. B.J. 338 (1976).
235. 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
236. 210 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967).
237. FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1975).
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which waives sovereign immunity.
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, acknowledged
this uncertainty in Gordon v. City of West Palm Beach:3' "We are
frank to admit that the current status of municipal tort liability is
not at all clear. ... "39 In Gordon the father of a motorcyclist who
died from a collision with an automobile at the intersection of a
street and alley brought a wrongful death and survival action
against the city. The complaint alleged that the city was negligent
in the design, construction, and maintenance of the intersection and
in failing to warn of a known hazardous condition. The plaintiff also
alleged that the city's traffic engineer was negligent in failing to
erect traffic control devices at the intersection.
Finding the doctrine of governmental immunity applicable, the
circuit court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, reviewed the leading cases of Hargrove
v. Town of Cocoa Beach'49 and Modlin v. City of Miami Beach"' and
held that the Modlin decision only applies to municipal torts involv-
ing governmental functions, not to those involving proprietary func-
tions."' Based on these determinations, the court delineated the
following conclusions as to the current status of municipal tort lia-
bility: (1) a municipality has the same tort liability as a private
corporation in performing proprietary activities or services; (2) a
municipality is liable in tort under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior for governmental activities "only when such tort is committed
against one with whom the agent or employee is in privity, or with
whom he is dealing or is otherwise in contact in a direct transaction
or confrontation";'" and (3) a municipality remains immune to tort
liability with regard to those activities characterized as judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative, or quasi-legislative. Furthermore, the
238. 321 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
239. Id. at 79.
240. 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
241. 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967).
242. The Hargrove decision appeared to repudiate the proprietary-governmental func-
tion distinction in abolishing sovereign immunity for "executive" actions of a municipality.
However, the holding in Hargrove was later restricted and modified in Modlin where the
Supreme Court of Florida held that in order for a municipality to be liable for a tort arising
from the performance of a governmental function, the duty owed to the claimant by the
allegedly negligent municipal officer must be "something more" than the duty owed by that
officer to the general public. 201 So. 2d at 75-76.
243. 321 So. 2d at 80, quoting City of Tampa v. Davis, 226 So. 2d 450, 454 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1969).
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court noted that the construction, maintenance, and repair of mu-
nicipal streets have long been held to be a proprietary, rather than
governmental, function. 44 Thus, the court held that the plaintiff's
allegations of negligence constituted a cause of action against the
city and reversed the trial court's dismissal as to it. However, upon
finding the installation and maintenance of traffic control devices
to be a governmental function, the court affirmed the dismissal of
the complaint as to the traffic engineer, who apparently owed no
special duty to the motorcyclist.
The Gordon court noted that its decigion appeared to be in
conflict with that of Nobles v. City of Jacksonville24 where the
District Court of Appeal, First District, had held as a matter of law
that the City of Jacksonville was not liable for the negligent mainte-
nance of a bridge. The Fourth District construed Nobles as inter-
preting the Hargrove and Modlin cases to mean that municipal tort
liability exists only where there is a direct relationship between a
negligent city agent and the person injured.
Subsequently, in City of Tallahassee v. Elliot""6 the District
Court of Appeal, First District, stated that the Fourth District had
misinterpreted the facts and holding of Nobles. The First District
emphasized that Nobles did not hold that the construction, mainte-
nance, and repair of streets were not proprietary services, but in-
stead held that the City of Jacksonville was not charged with the
duty of construction, maintenance, or repair of a bridge owned by
the State of Florida since this duty was the state's. The First Dis-
trict went on to hold in City of Tallahassee that the city was not
entitled to the dismissal of a complaint alleging negligence in the
maintenance of a drainage ditch and culvert since the maintenance
of a city drainage system is a proprietary function.
A question not presented in Gordon or City of Tallahassee, and
one which has yet to be answered by a Florida appellate court, adds
to the present uncertainty: what is the effect of the act waiving
sovereign immunity47 on municipal liability? As previously dis-
cussed, judicial decision has abrogated municipal immunity for neg-
ligence involving proprietary functions, as well as for negligence
244. 321 So. 2d at 79; accord, Trumpe v. City of Coral Springs, 326 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1976).
245. 316 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
246. 326 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
247. FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1975).
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involving governmental functions of the executive branch where a
special duty was owed to the injured person. 4' Thus, in light of the
$50,000/$100,000 limit"9 imposed by the act, a question arises as to
whether the act, in effect, modifies the partial common law abroga-
tion by now limiting the liability of a municipality in instances
where it was previously unlimited. A recent Florida Attorney Gen-
eral Opinion 50 answers this question in the negative, and it is sub-
mitted that this opinion represents the better view.
B. State Sovereign Immunity
In Circuit Court of Twelfth Judicial Circuit v. Department of
Natural Resources5' the Department of Natural Resources was sued
by the parents of a child who was killed in a state park. Having paid
an entrance fee, the child was killed by an alligator while she was
swimming in an artificial lake within the park. The Department's
alleged liability was predicated on theories of negligence, strict lia-
bility in tort, and breach of contract. Unable to rely on the present
statutory waiver of sovereign immunity because the child's death
occurred before the effective date of Florida Statutes section 768.28
(1975), the parents alleged that the Department had waived sover-
eign immunity by engaging in the proprietary function of operating
the park. The plaintiffs contended that the sovereign immunity
provision of the Florida Constitution 5 ' does not preclude waiver of
sovereign immunity by means other than legislative enactment or
constitutional amendment. The Supreme Court of Florida rejected
this contention, however, and held that the Department of Natural
Resources was protected from suit by sovereign immunity. The
court found the governmental-proprietary distinction, which has
been utilized as a test for waiver of sovereign immunity in cases
involving municipalities, to be inapplicable to actions involving the
state or its agencies.
248. 321 So. 2d at 80.
249. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1975).
250. Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 076-41 (Feb. 23, 1976). See also Leesfield, Municipal Immuni-
ties in Florida, J. ACAD. FLA. TRIAL LAW., Sept. 1976, at 8.
251. 339 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1976).
252. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 13: "Provision may be made by general law for bringing suit
against the state as to all liabilities now existing or hereafter originating."
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